At Crypto-87 conference, we proposed identity-based key distribution systems for generating a common secret conference key for two or more users. Protocols were shown for three configurations: a ring, a complete graph, and a star. Yacobi has made an impersonation attack on the protocols for the complete graph and star networks. This paper proposes improved identity-based key distribution protocols t o counter his attack.
Introduction
Identity-based cryptosystems can simplify key management in cryptosystems. Shamir and Fiat proposed identity-based signature schemes [l, 21, and Okamoto proposed an identity-based scheme [3] for a public key distribution system [4] . In these schemes for two users, messages among users are authenticated using each user's identification information. If two or more users want to hold a conference, they must derive one common secret communication key for each link in the network. This common key for rn (2 2) users is called a conference key.
Ingemarsson et al. [5] presented a conference key distribution system (CKDS) with no authentication, where users are connected in a ring network. At the Crypto-87 conference, we [6] proposed an identity-based system for generating a conference key with authentication, called a a identity-based conference key distribution system (ICKDS). Protocols in ICKDS were shown for three configurations: ring (Type-1), complete graph (Type-2), and star (Type-3). Yacobi [7] has made a n impersonation attack on the Type-3. His attacking method can be generalized to Type-2. This paper proposes improved identitybased key distribution protocols to counter his attack. The previous protocol can detec't a uni-directional attack and it cannot detect a bi-directional attack. However, the new protocol can detect both the uni-directional attack and the bi-directional attack. In Section 2, revised protocols of T y p e 2 and Type-3 axe described, clarifying the difference between the previous and new versions. In Section 3, Secllrity for these protocols is discussed. Details of the attack by Yacobi are stated, and it is shown that our improvement resolves the problem.
Improved ICKDSs
All ICKDSs are implemented in two phases: the first phase is carried out at a trusted center, and the second phase at each user's location. During the first phase, the trusted center generates a secret system key, a public system key, and secret user keys with users' identification information. The secret system key is known only t o the center. The public system key is common t o all users. Each secret user key, which is transmitted through secure channel such as smart card, is known only to each user and the center. Once the first phase is carried out, the second phase can be repeated to generate a different conference key. In the second phase, no further interaction with the center is required either t o generate a key or to verify proofs of identity.
For simplicity, only improved protocols in a complete graph (Type-2) and in a star (Type-3) are shown in Subsections 2.1 and 2.2, respectively.
During the first phase of Type-2 and Type-3, the center generates three large primes p , q, and r, and the partial product n = pq. It determines integers (el d ) in a way similar to that of the RSA cryptosystem [S] :
where e is a prime such that nr/2 < e < nr. Note that every integer in [l, nr] except e is coprime to e. The center also determines an integer g which is a primitive element over GF(p), GF(q), and GF(T). Note that g is easily generated while the factors of ( p -1), (4 -l), and ( r -1) are known. For user i whose identification information is I;, the center calculates integer S;:
Note that Ii = Sf mod nr. As a result, the center generates a secret systemkey (p, q , d ) , a public system-key ( n , T , g , e), and a secret user-key Si for user i.
Improved protocol in a complete graph (Type-2)
During the second phase of Type-2, the conference key is generated and simultaneously distributed among m users. Users are connected in a complete graph network so that they always send messages to all other users. The key generation algorithm is the same for each user. For convenience, the procedure for two typical users, labeled i and j (1 5 i, j 5 m, i # j ) , can be described as follows:
[Protocol] step 1: User a' chooses a random number Pi that is coprime to ( r -1). He computes P;:
3)
and keeps P; and Fi secret. He then sends (Xi, x):
4)
Y , = S;gxipi mod nr, User j chooses a secret random number Rj. He then sends ( A j i , Bji):
7)
to user i. step 3: User i receives ( A j i , Bji). He checks whether the following (rn -1) congruences hold:
If (2.9) holds, user i caa ver* that the message came from user j .
He then computes conference key Ki:
(2.10)
The value of Ki (1 <_ i 5 m) is the same for a l l users, because
Remarks:
(1) The exponent terms Xi in (2.5) and (2.6) and Aji in (2.8) and (2.9) in this version were expressed by a constant c in the previous version [6] . This improvement makes Yacobi's attack on Type-2 and Type-3 ineffective. Details will be discussed in Section 3.
(2) Since e is chosen such that nr/2 < e < nr, Xi and Aji are coprime to e with the probability l-l/nr (= 1). This property in the improved version inherits from the previous version, where c is coprime to e. This property has effect of countermeasure on some attacks other than Yacobi's attack. X i ' (mod n), Cij E A; (mod n), and related computations. The purpose of such congruences was to detect a uni-directional impersonation attack [6] other than Yacobi's attack. These check congruences and related computations are omitted in the new protocol because the new protocol can detect such attack in addition to Yacobi's attack.
Improved protocol in a star (Type-3)
Type-2 can be simplified by restricting the process so that j = 1 and 2 5 i 5 rn. Therefore, users are connected in a star network so that messages are transmitted between user 1 and user i ( 
Security
The security of the proposed systems is based on the difficulty of deriving secret information such as (p, q, d, S;, P;, p;, R,, K;) in Type2 and Type-3 from public keys, transmitted messages, and other user's secret keys. Secrecy of (p, q, d, Si) is based on the difEculty of factoring a large number n. Secrecy of (Pi, F;, R,, K ; ) is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithm over GF(T). Considering the best known algorithms for factoring n = pq [9] and computing the discrete logarithm over GF(r) [lo] , a designer can choose the size of p , q, and r . From the security viewpoint, the size of p and q should be at least 256 bits long, and the size of r should be at least 512 bits long.
The secrecy of the above secret keys is believed to be ensured in the previous version and the new version. However, the authenticity of the previous version has been partly broken by Yacobi's impersonation attack because it had weak points. The new version described in this paper realizes protocols to detect his attack. In this section, a summary of his attacking method and the effect of our countermeasures are shown.
Yacobi's bi-directional attack [7]
By extending our uni-directional attack [6], Yacobi [7] showed a bi-directional real time attack between user i and user j in Type-3 (2 5 i 5 m, j = 1). Note that his attacking method c m be generalized to Type-2 (1 5 i,j 5 m) . Since the attacker can hold both a correct key and a false key, this bi-directional impersonation attack would be successful in the previous protocol.
We summarize the generalized Yacobi's attack on the previous version where the constant term c was used instead of variable exponents X i and AjiAn attacker cuts the link between user j (or "center user" in the star) and user i. He mediates every communication between them. When communicating with user j he pretends to be user i (denoted by T), and when communicating with user i he pretends to be user j (denoted by 7). First, the attacker chooses random PI, and computes its inverse ?s' modulo T -1. He also computes the inverse of e (denoted by E) modulo r -1. For step 1, the attacker eavesdrops the message ( X i , x) from user i to user j . Using the Chinese remainder theorem, he computes (zi, g ) modulo nr satisfying:
and sends the modiiied message (zi, $) to user j . For step 2, user j verifies --yj.
K; = A,; mod T = geaR1 mod T .
Using &, attacker 'i creates the session key:
(3.8)
User 1, who is center user, creates session key: K1 = geZR1 mod T .
(3-9)
Using Fl, attacker creates the session key: Note that ki = and K1 = K ; (2 5 i 5 m). This attack on Type-3 is more realistic than that on Type-2 because it requires that the attacker manipulates only one link from user i (2 5 i 5 rn) to user 1.
--Ti K ; = Ali mod r = geZR1 mod r.
Improved protocol's effect against t h e Yacobi's attack
Note that the exponent terms X i and Aji in this improved protocol were expressed by a constant c in the previous protocol [S]. This improvement makes Yacobi's attack on Type-2 and Type3 ineffective. In the improved protocol, if an attacker adopts Yacobi's attack, ID checks mod TI T in (2.6) and (2.9) (or (3.2) and (3.4) ) do not pass. Since the purpose and function of (2.6) and (2.9) is the same, the case for (2.6) is described as a4 example. Consider the congruence (2.6) modulo TZT by separating it 'into a congruence modulo n and a congruence modulo T. A check congruence modulo n in (2.6) is not satisfied because Therefore, (3.11) results in 
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Note that a check congruence modulo r in (2.6) is satisfied because Therefore, the Yacobi's bidirectional attack becomes detectable.
Conclusion
Security has been improved in the new protocol with the variable exponents. That is, the improved protocol counters Yacobi's attack. The change of exponent terms has the same effect as the additional check congruences in the previous version. By deleting such additional check congruences, transmission eEciency is also improved in the new protocols. This is a side effect of improving security.
